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On Three Paradigms 
of Emotional Communication 
in Music
The history of thinking related to the musical expression of 
emotions is probably as old as music itself. It occurs already in antiquity, 
in the Greek theory of ethos. Yet the conviction as to the possibility of 
arousing particular emotions through music was treated at that time in 
a quite specific way. Affect was identified with the Greek pathos, the most 
important designation of which was suffering (at least in the Aristotelian 
sense), opposed to ethos, or virtue, and to positive value in general. Also 
among the Stoics, motus animi contra rationem was perceived negatively, 
although with Peripathos, and later Aristotle, it was eupatia (mediocri- 
tas), that is, a balance between ethos and pathos, that became the ideal. 
Music could, and was supposed to, participate mainly in categories of 
value, and the conviction as to the possibility of connoting certain values 
and emotions through particular musical figures (above all the modi) led 
in effect to the postulate of the restricted use of these structures, which 
were in some way responsible for stirring emotions.
In mediaeval theory, thinking in terms of the ancient categories and 
the avoidance of deeper emotionality in art clashed with a different per­
ception of the affects -  especially of suffering. According to Rolf Dam- 
mann,1 the chief watchword of the mediaeval martyrs -  ‘Deo gratias, qui 
nos pro suo nomine ad gloriosam passionem perducere dignatus est’ -  
opened the gates to affects as positively understood, since the profound 
sense of Christ’s suffering is transferred to man, whose suffering also 
gains a positive sense. Thus mediaeval affect became man’s aspiration to 
God, the epitome of the idea of agape -  redemption through love and suf­
fering. However, in its aspiration to reflect the divine ideal, music em­
ploys chiefly the category of number and proportion, and so justifies di­
vine and human suffering in a rational way. This opposition doubtless
1 Rolf Dammann, Der Musikbegriff im deutschen Barock (Cologne, 1968), 230.
results from the fact that mediaeval music theory was very strongly rooted 
in ancient thought. Johannes Ockeghem, in his musical concept of imita- 
tio Christi, is still employing exclusively representative figures and sym­
bols, avoiding the expression of actual emotions. Numerus and proportio, 
which music reflected, were still being opposed at this time to the liter­
ary text, at times carrying concretised emotions, although tristitia and 
duritia cordis were already giving rise to ‘errors’ in the musical art. 
However, negative affects were perceived as undesirable and — still ac­
cording to ancient tenets — soon gave way to positive qualities.
The breakthrough of the Renaissance, signifying a new, referential 
link between text and music,2 founded on the laws of imitazione della 
natura e delle parole, brought with it the need -  so characteristic of all 
music of the modern era -  to enhance the emotion contained in the text, 
and at the same time the musical imitation of human emotions. The first 
coherent modern-era theory of musical expression, considerably nearer 
our times than Greek theory and probably constituting a watershed in 
how people thought about musical emotionality, was formulated by Gio- 
seffo Zarlino (Le istitutioni harmoniche),3 who forcefully emphasised the 
need for selecting adequate musical to literary means: ‘and so it would 
not be appropriate were we to use sorrowful harmonies and a serious 
measure with a cheerful subject, nor should we use cheerful harmonies 
and light -  or quick, as we have come to call them -  measures where the 
words speak of things mournful and tearful’.4 The use of chromatics with 
the texts of madrigals and the emergence of madrigalisms results in 
a sort of obsession with mirroring a text by means of music, although it 
does not yet give rise to a coherent system of affects. That affectus ex- 
primere which appears in Zarlino essentially constitutes a postulate of 
the static reflection of words by music.
Only the emergence in the Baroque of a new purpose for the musical 
work, namely to move the listener, prompted the elaboration of a formal­
ised theory of the affects. It seems impossible to overestimate the role of 
the receiving subject in the development of a modern way of thinking
2 In its broadest understanding, the notion of affect embraces all of music’s refer­
ential allusions to the emotions it arouses in the receiver. Through music, ‘the lis­
tener’s heart should be moved, and so affects should be aroused (in him)’. (Michael 
Praetorius, Syntagma musicum (Wolfenbüttel, 1619), 229). Only Hanslick’s definition of 
music as ‘forms driven by the motion of sounds’ (Eduard Hanslick, Vom Musikalisch- 
Schönen (Leipzig, 1854), and especially its reception, relativised the pan-referential un­
derstanding of music that had accompanied it since the birth of reflection on its subject.
3 Gioseffo Zarlino, Le istitutioni harmoniche (Venice, 1558), ch. IV.
4 Cit. on the basis of the translation by Anna Szweykowska in Zygmunt 
M. Szweykowski, Między kunsztem a ekspresją [Between art and expression] (Kra­
ków, 1992), 85-86.
about musical emotion. Thus was born the first of the three paradigms 
suggested in the title. Whereas music of the Middle Ages or the Renais­
sance seemed to be addressed directly to the Absolute, whilst man could 
only attempt to penetrate the sense of that mission, only music of the Ba­
roque seems to fully realise the postulates of humanism, coming closer to 
man. The analogy of the musical system and the system of affects is -  in 
Andreas Hartmann’s opinion5 -  twofold. It is linked on the one hand to 
the kinship between the nature of sounds and the nature of affects and 
their mutual proportions, and on the other to the systématisation of 
sounds and affects, thanks to which every sound, figure or affect gains its 
particular place in the hierarchy of the natural logos. This leads to the 
assertion of the metaphysical aspect of the theory of affects. Their defin­
ing and systématisation free man from the fear of chaos. As we become 
acquainted with our emotions and their nature, we go some way to gain­
ing control over them. In this sense, the idea of harnessing the affects re­
sults from the spirit of rationalism. The conviction of the possibility of 
differentiating the affects, which constitute a sort of continuum, the pos­
sibility of dividing them into groups and classes, the possibility of de­
scribing them precisely and also -  in particular -  of linking them to the 
physiology of the human body, which may be formed and transformed 
through the adroit use of the affects, constitutes one of the most impor­
tant myths of seventeenth-century learning and philosophy. In this 
sense, therefore, it is a method for ordering human emotions. The extrac­
tion of the affects from the human body enables them to be scientifically 
ordered. The return (perception) of the ordered affects to man constitutes 
at the same time a method for restoring to him natural order.
Yet at the same time the Baroque strips man of his inner harmony, 
endorsed by humanistic ideals since ancient times. Not only does it cast 
him full pelt into the world of emotions, but it also employs strong, ex­
treme contrasts and contradictions in their expression. However, this 
does not mean that the concept of Baroque affects becomes subjective. 
One would search in vain among treatises from that era for passages 
speaking of a composer being moved or of the subjective feelings of the 
individual. Quite the opposite: we consistently encounter here an emo­
tional type that remains within the framework of the natural sciences 
and anthropology. It would appear, then, that the rational thinking of 
the Renaissance has changed here only its focus, remaining the same 
method or mode of seeing reality. In the Baroque, the musical motus 
harmonicus retains its functional relationship with the motus animae -
5 Andreas Hartmann, Affektendarstellung und Naturbeherrschung in der Musik 
des Barocks’, International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music 1/11 
(1980), 25-44.
the moving of souls. Number and proportion, still central in the Baroque, 
are now at the service of the receiver, whose emotional reactions are cal­
culated, as it were, by the composer. The relationes harmonicae and non 
harmonicae now go further than simply describing the text, becoming 
strategically calculated relations tailored to the expectations of the lis­
tener, seasoned with astrology, magic and the science of the tempera­
ments. Interestingly, that ‘calculation of emotions’ on the part of the 
composer is aimed at provoking spontaneous and sensual reactions from 
the receiver. Thus the composer becomes the alchemist of the Baroque 
listener’s soul. As for the affects, during the Baroque they become pre­
cisely defined, measurable quantities, which the composer must come to 
know, whilst preserving the most objective, rational, scientific attitude 
possible. Perhaps the first concise typology of the affects was proposed by 
René Descartes himself, in whose footsteps music theorists followed. 
Most typologies of the affects employ a primary division into joyful and 
sad affects. There is no need here to cite and present in detail even some 
of the popular typologies of the affects; for the most part, they give 
a similar set, differing from one another only insignificantly.
The postulates of expressing affects through music gave rise to more 
detailed considerations as to the methods of triggering them in the re­
ceiver, which is linked to the rhetorical discourse as part of the theory of 
the affects. Whilst philosophical, and especially psychological and physio­
logical, knowledge was a sort of a priori method for bringing order to the 
human soul, rhetoric always constituted operative knowledge and deter­
mined the possibility of employing the theory of affects in practice, thus 
verifying their action. The speech of the orator has a distinct sign struc­
ture. Musical oration involves distinguishing the sign of an affect by fur­
nishing the loci topici contained in the text of a composition with specific 
musical properties (or abstracting musical signs in instrumental com­
positions), then inducing the affect in the speaker and transferring it to 
the receiver, who experiences the same affect which the speaker aroused 
in himself. So this emotional communication is analogical, in a way, to 
the physiological function of the affect. But rhetoric does not seek the 
causes of such a state of affairs (like physiology or psychology) and con­
centrates solely on the action itself, and so on the practical verification of 
this interactive mechanism. Thus it is crucial who arouses the affect, in 
respect to whom the affect is aroused and also for what reason it came to 
exist. Rhetoric defines the principles according to which the speech (ora- 
tio) is prepared; musical rhetoric, meanwhile, defines the principles gov­
erning the creation of the musical oration, and so the musical work.6
6 From the beginnings of its creation, inventio, that is, seeking ideas and topoi, 
through dispositio, that is, the defining of its adequate form (both horizontally, in
It is thanks to musical rhetoric that the principles of the Wort-Ton re­
lationship in vocal-instrumental music are codified. An understanding of 
affectiveness in a vocal-instrumental composition seems strengthened by 
an understanding of the text, which confirms and names specific mean­
ings and emotions in a literal way. The verbal text certainly enhances 
the clarity of the inter subjective communication and helps to make the 
composition’s emotive code more unambiguously legible, although it is 
not an essential condition for its coming into being. The model situation 
involves the reading of the affective loci topici in the text and their fur­
nishing with adequate musical figures, which further enhance the action 
of these mots clef. Thus the existence of the verbal text on one hand helps 
to simplify the process of decodifying the affect, but on the other can also 
mean its further complication. Simplification occurs under the -  seem­
ingly obvious -  premise that music follows the lead of the text, in accor­
dance with the principle of imitazione della natura e delle parole which 
held sway in music from at least the sixteenth century onwards. How­
ever, it is often the case, particularly in later music, that the verbal text 
and the music carry different emotional codes. Such a situation may 
arise naturally from a composer’s lack of intention to portray with his 
music the emotions contained in the text. This would appear to have 
a number of possible causes. Sometimes the composer deems the emotive 
content of the verbal text sufficiently suggestive to preclude the need for 
a typical confirmation of these emotions through adequate musical struc­
tures. Other times, he fails to reproduce the loci topici through negli­
gence, often resulting from contrafactum, haste or -  in extreme cases -  
incompetence. Yet he may also intentionally match inadequate musical 
figures to given loci topici. This procedure, particularly frequent in the 
nineteenth century, expressing irony7 or artistic distance, demands
time, and vertically, in space) and the disposition of specified parameters of the musi­
cal work, then decoratio (ornatio) -  the process of embellishing the utterance by 
means of musical-rhetorical figures -  and finally memoria and pronuntiatio\ such are 
the stages of memorising and performing the musical oration. See Wiesław Lisecki, 
‘Vademecum muzycznej ars oratoria’ [Vade-mecum of the musical ars oratoria], 
Conor 2 (1993), 13-26.
7 One example of the intentional opposition between the affect designated by the 
verbal text, on the one hand, and the music, on the other, is Robert Schumann’s song 
‘Ein Jüngling liebt ein Mädchen’. The verbal text, full of negative emotional expres­
sion, speaking of romantic misunderstandings leading to mortal tragedy, contrasts 
with the extremely bright and ‘unproblematic’ disposition of the music -  a lively 
rhythm, simple and ostentatiously trite cadences in C major. The opposition produced 
between the two media helps create a new ironic quality. Schumann’s acute sensitiv­
ity to the text leads to the creation of a very interesting new emotive quality between 
the music and the text. Referring to the eighteenth-century terminology of the affects,
a twofold competence on the part of the receiver, who theoretically should 
perceive both the emotional message carried by the verbal text and also 
the differing or contrasting emotional communication carried by the mu­
sic, as well as the clash of these two messages, which produces a new 
emotive quality.
For Johannes Mattheson, the expression of affects is a key category in 
music. His theory may be regarded on the one hand as the sum of the 
seventeenth century’s experience in considering affect and on the other 
as a pragmatically exact prescription for a way of seeing affects in the 
eighteenth century -  a sort of communis opinio of that period. Yet an­
other systematic exposition of the Baroque theory of affects -  one which 
thrived throughout the eighteenth century -  is Friedrich Wilhelm Mar- 
purg’s treatise Kritische Briefe zur Tonkunst (1762), in which the indi­
vidual affects from the joyful (Lust) and sad (Unlust) groups are enumer­
ated and catalogued.8 Marpurg’s rather derivative concept attests 
Mattheson’s enduring influence in this area and contains exact, detailed 
descriptions of several dozen affects, with specific musical properties as­
cribed to each. It is worth taking a closer look at one of Marpurg’s de­
scriptions to see the exactness, but also the kind of dogmatism, with 
which they were prepared. In respect to the affect of Traurigkeit (‘sad­
ness’), he writes that ‘containing a high degree of sensual discontent, it is 
expressed through a slow tempo and a sombre, mournful melody, which 
is interspersed with manifold sighing motifs [...] in the area of which are 
most commonly used small intervals and which builds up an all­
engulfing dissonant harmony’.9 This description, like those of Mattheson, 
constitutes a sort of recipe for arousing the affect of sadness. A ready­
made idea for the composer.
The concept of Mattheson and Marpurg clearly derives from Ba­
roque aesthetics, inscribing itself in the first of the paradigms of the 
communication of emotions in music. Later statements by music aes- 
theticians are linked to the emergence of the Classical aesthetic, pres­
aging the next, second paradigm. Already in the work of Christian
the text portrays desperatio, the music hilaritas, whilst the new affect that arises 
from the clash between the words and the music is irrisio.
8 Friedrich Wilhelm Marpurg enumerates a total of twenty-seven affects, giving 
for some hints regarding music.
9 ‘[...] dass die Traurigkeit ein sehr hoher Grad des sinnlichen Missvergnügens 
oder Verdrusses, in langsamer Bewegung mit einer matten und schläfrigen Melodie, 
die mit vielen Seufzern unterbrochen ist [...] in welcher die engeren Klangstufen 
vorzüglich gebraucht werden und welche auf eine herrschende dissonierende harmo- 
nie erbaut wird, auszudrücken ist’; cit. after Ulrich Thieme, Die Affektenlehre im phi- 
losphischen und musikalischen Denken des Barock (Celle, 1984), 243.
Gottfried Krause,10 we see a clear watershed, manifest in the very title of 
his treatise, Krause’s ‘musical poetry’ being but a step away from the 
Romantic conception of the German Tondichter. The composer is no 
longer merely a musical artisan, who with a mathematical precision ren­
ders in music the rules set out in treatises, and becomes a ‘tone poet’, 
who has at his disposal a wide range of means for arousing in the re­
ceiver all sorts of emotions. The receiver of music in the second half of 
the eighteenth century ought to be -  similarly to his Baroque protoplast
-  moved. However, the ways in which this is achieved are somewhat dif­
ferent. Inspired partly by French sentimentalism (Charles Batteux, Jean 
Jacques Rousseau), partly by German Sturm und Drang, subjectivism 
comes to play an increasingly important role in the perception of affects 
and of musical emotions in general. In Johann G. Sulzer’s Allgemeine 
Theorie der schónen Kiinste, u  we read no more of dogmatically catego­
rised affects but of the ‘expression of the individual “I” ’, and of ‘moving 
the composer’s soul’ instead of ‘portraying affects’.12 In this sense Sulzer 
opposes not only Baroque theories but also the aesthetic of imitatio, once 
more being trumpeted by the sentimentalists.
Whilst for Batteux, emotional musical language was still objectivised, 
Sulzer postulated its wholesale de-objectivisation. Other new postulates 
were the passivity of the receiver, who was to ‘yield to all the emotions’,13 
and the utmost fantasy of the creative artist14 in forging emotions. This 
does not mean, however, that the affects of old were consigned by Sulzer 
to oblivion. Quite the contrary: although their semantic scope had 
changed, they were still the determining factor in the musical work. In 
Sulzer, the definition of music is based on its emotionality: ‘music is 
a succession of sounds which arise from emotions’.15 His definition does 
not contradict Baroque definitions. The interchangeable use of the terms 
Affekt, Empfindung and Leidenschaft occurred in German lexis from the 
seventeenth century onwards. Sulzer divides Empfindungen into two 
classes, namely psychological and moral emotions, ascribing to the for­
mer Leidenschaften, which should be seen as no more than the former
10 Christian Gottfried Krause, Von der musikalischen Poesie (Berlin, 1753). Krau­
se distinguishes and discusses thirty-three different affects.
11 Johann G. Sulzer, Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste (Leipzig, 1778-1779).
12 See Carl Dahlhaus, ‘Zum Affektbegriff der frühdeutschen Oper’, Hamburger 
Jahrbuch für Musikwissenschaft 5 (1981), 107-111.
13 ‘[...] sich allen Empfindungen überlassen’; see Johann G. Sulzer, Allgemeine 
Theorie, 148.
14 Ibid., 9-14.
15 ‘Musik ist Folge von Tönen, die aus leidenschaftlicher Empfindung entstehen’; 
ibid., 142.
‘affects’. In characterising the various elements of the musical work, Sulzer, 
in a similar, referential, way to his predecessors, links specific emotional 
qualities with musical means. These links are naturally traditional and 
familiar from Baroque treatises. Despite a drastic change in language 
and discourse, the staffage of means remains essentially the same.
Yet while the ‘psychological characters’ are essentially convergent 
with the former affects, Sulzer’s categories of ‘moral characters’ influ­
enced the important change in music aesthetics that occurred around the 
turn of the Baroque and Classical eras. The emergence of the idea of ab­
solute music, expressed by Wilhelm Wackenroder, Ludwig Tieck and 
other aestheticians of the beginning of the nineteenth century, and also 
by theorists of sonata form (in particular Heinrich Christoph Koch), is 
linked chiefly to the domination of those ‘moral characters’. Georg August 
Griesinger quotes a statement allegedly formulated by Joseph Haydn, 
whereby the symphony contained mostly ‘moral characters’ (thus we can 
assume that a lesser role is ascribed in this context to ‘psychological 
characters’).16 Even if this statement is only attributed to Haydn, it is 
worth expanding on the idea. The instrumental and vocal music of the 
Classical era and early Romanticism do indeed seem to head down differ­
ent paths, and they are lacking the unity which was characteristic in this 
respect of the music of the Baroque. Instrumental music appears to have 
been obliged to forge for itself what in modern parlance we would call 
new channels of transmission, or of access to the receiver. The method 
postulated by Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach in his Versuch, and also by 
other representatives of the Berlin school, linked to the incorporation 
into instrumental music of a stream of affects taken from vocal music, 
failed to work because of the lack of formal integration in these composi­
tions. Thus the concept of ‘moral characters’ perhaps became a hallmark 
of the vigorous development of instrumental music. Vocal music, mean­
while, seeking new means of expression, did not have to relinquish en­
tirely the previously elaborated models; it sufficed to adapt them. For 
this reason it would appear that while in Classical (at least in the sphere 
of the Viennese Classics) and early Romantic instrumental music ‘moral 
characters’ do indeed prevail over ‘psychological characters’, the presence 
in vocal music of the text (often of Baroque provenance) determines the 
favouring of ‘psychological characters’.
It is also worth bearing in mind that Sulzer’s modern concept was not 
the only one with widespread currency in the music of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. In the famous eighteenth-century textbooks of in­
16 Georg August Griesinger, Biographische Notizen über Joseph Haydn (Leipzig, 
1810), 117.
strumental playing (Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach, Leopold Mozart, Jo­
hann J. Quantz), constituting in equal measure theoretical treatises and 
textbooks on the aesthetics of music, the notion of affect is used very ex­
tensively. To take one example, Quantz, in his search for an ideal anal­
ogy between music (and performance) and speech (Musik und Rede), in 
the chapter ‘Vom guten Vortrage im Singen und Spielen überhaupt’, 
writes that ‘the performer himself should enter into the principal and 
secondary affects that he is seeking to express’.17 The aspect of the per­
former’s personal identification with an affect demanded by Quantz is 
perhaps the most characteristic feature of the second of the suggested 
paradigms of emotional communication.
Changes in the perception of affects were strongly dependent on the 
degree of awareness among those receiving them. It is worth pointing out 
that eighteenth-century audiences -  with the exception of the opera- 
going public in Italy -  were recruited exclusively from among the aristoc­
racy and were generally very well educated. The increasingly numerous 
Liebhabern -  aficionados and amateurs -  were demanding a different ex­
position of the doctrine of the affects -  one that would be more concrete 
and practical. At the same time, the fashion for external emotionality 
that took hold particularly in Germany during the mid eighteenth cen­
tury even led to a heightened interest in the affects. Yet the Berlin school 
theorists essentially wrote of the same affects about which the rational­
ists had discoursed during the seventeenth century. All that had changed 
was the language of this discourse and, as already mentioned, the points 
of gravity. As the aesthetics of feelings took shape and developed, music 
began to represent more subjective emotional states. However, objective 
tendencies towards expressing through music more strictly categorised 
emotional qualities -  affects -  were not wholly lost. Essentially, then, the 
emotional expression of music functioned in the situation in which music 
found itself during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries on several 
levels: as a tendency towards expressing through music subjective feel­
ings in the receiver, as a tendency towards the objective representation 
by music of affects, by means of a fixed set of musical means and figures, 
and finally as affective reactions to music by the listener. Thus the affec­
tiveness of music is both an immanent property of the musical language, 
on the one hand, and the reactiveness of the receiver to that language, 
conceived in an intentional way, on the other. And between the ‘active­
ness’ of the music itself and the ‘reactiveness’ of the listener to its lan­
guage there exists a naturally organic link.
17 ‘Der Ausführer eines Stückes muss sich selbst in die Haupt- und Nebenleiden­
schaften, die er ausdrücken soll, zu versetzen suchen’; see ibid., 51.
Knowledge of the affects is also not forgotten in the nineteenth cen­
tury,18 although discourses about them are different from those of both 
the Baroque and Classical eras.19 It is hard to disagree with Hartmut 
Grimm’s thesis that the end of the Baroque theory of the affects is at 
once the beginning of the path for the theory of extramusical expression. 
The author sees the beginning of a new treatment of the affects -  one 
which influences their understanding throughout the nineteenth century
-  in statements made by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing in a letter to Moses 
Mendelssohn of 1757,20 in which he claims that negative affects are just 
as ‘pleasing’ as positive affects, since they remain affects, and every af­
fect is in essence pleasurable. Lessing’s statements betray a different 
way of seeing the affects to that of the representatives of the Berlin 
school, of Koch or Sulzer. He treats affect in abstracto, and so sees its ac­
tion as undefined, abstracted, in a way, from reality. Of course, this con­
ception is not entirely new, and it is worth adding that in some sense it 
was shared by theorists of the Baroque, who saw no need for an affect to 
be aroused in the composer or performer for it to be aroused in the re­
ceiver. Yet Lessing’s statements are informed by a more radical idea as 
well. In his opinion, a sad, unpleasant affect need not be unpleasant even 
for the receiver, whose perception Lessing enhances with that same ar­
tistic distance which Baroque composers reserved for themselves. It 
seems that we may speak here of the beginning of a new, third paradigm 
in musical emotional communication, which comes to be characterised by 
a distance towards the emotional content of a composition, manifest both 
in the composer (and the performer) and in the receiver of a musical 
work. Where Lessing’s idea is innovative is in its complete opposition to 
the German conceptions of reine Gefühle, in which both the emitter and 
the receiver of the musical message had to be moved for the affect to act 
properly.
Thus the central problem shaping the peculiarity of the third para­
digm of musical emotional communication appears to be artistic distance, 
in other words, the distance of the receiver (the subject) towards the 
‘emotional content’ of the musical work (the object). The subject need not
18 See Heinrich Christoph Koch, Musikalisches Lexikon (Frankfurt, 1802).
19 Dahlhaus considers that the fundamental change that occurred in aesthetics 
between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is linked to a change in the way art 
theory was perceived -  more specifically, with the exchange of the linguistic (sign) 
orientation, with musical language understood simply as an extraconventional gift of 
nature, for a dialectic orientation, which would lead to subjectivisation and the diffe­
rentiation of expression. See Carl Dahlhaus and Norbert Miller, Europäische Roman­
tik in der Musik, vol. 1 Oper und symphonischer Stil 1770-1820 (Stuttgart, 1999), 236.
20 Ibid., 106.
be moved itself in order to perceive the power of the given affect. The 
emotion triggered by the affect is not the same as a real emotion experi­
enced under the effect of real stimuli. So music uses signs for affects, 
without personifying them, since the listener, recognising a sad affect, 
does not have to become sad. These signs would appear to be chiefly 
a consequence of cultural norms and conventions, which allow the compe­
tent receiver to recognise particular affects in a musical work. Yet this 
modern, and seemingly obvious and unquestionable, property of each 
musical work, which bids us see artistic emotionality through the filter of 
specific conventions, was not always so unequivocal. More than that -  in 
the postulates of most theories of emotions from the eighteenth or nine­
teenth century we even find an outright proclamation of the lack of such 
artistic distance. In his famous treatise on piano playing, constituting an 
aesthetic communis opinio on such subjects as musical expression in the 
eighteenth century, C. P. E. Bach wrote, among other things, that ‘[...] the 
musician cannot move (the listener) unless he himself is moved. He must 
partake of all the affects which he wishes to arouse in the listener’.21 It is 
of no consequence that Bach’s treatise concerned musical performance, as 
the process of composing was understood in an analogical way.
In the early reception of the Berliners’ ideas in the nineteenth cen­
tury, evident, for example, in Koch’s treatise, we can observe a retreat 
from a somewhat naive, direct way of seeing musical affects. The begin­
ning of the nineteenth century already brought attempts at rejecting any 
sort of objectivism of musical emotionality. The physician Charles Bell 
stated in his Essay on the Anatomy and Philosophy of Expression22 that 
emotions connected with music were completely resistant to rationalisa­
tion. Of a similar opinion was the evolutionist Herbert Spencer, who con­
sidered that the whole history of music constituted a continuum of the 
‘idealisation of the natural language of emotions’,23 although at the end 
of the nineteenth century another scholar, Friedrich von Hausegger, was 
still seeking to discuss musical emotions in terms of physiology.24 One of 
the key arguments in favour of the indirect interpretation of affective 
qualities contained in music is their restriction to European culture. In
21 ‘Ein Musickus nicht anders rühren kann, er sie dann selbst gerührt, so muss er 
notwendig sich selbst in alle Affekten setzen können, welche er bei seinem Zuhörer 
erregen will’. Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach, Versuch über die wahre Art das Clavier zu 
spielen, vol. 2 (Berlin, 1753-1762), 85.
22 Charles Bell, Essay on the Anatomy and Philosophy of Expression (London, 1806).
23 Hartmut Grimm, Musik und Natur. Musikalische Ausdrucksaesthetik im 19. 
Jahrhundert, in Zwischen Aufklaerung und Kulturindustrie, ed. Hanns-Werner Heis­
ter, Karin Heister-Grech and Gerhard Scheit (Hamburg, 1993), 110.
24 Ibid., 111.
the eighteenth-century world, in which awareness of the existence of for­
eign cultures had only a slight influence on Europeans’ understanding of 
their own culture and the artistic world seemed confined to Europe, the 
emotionality of music, functioning within the framework of particular 
figures, structures and topoi, could appear undeniable. As foreign musi­
cal cultures became better known, in the nineteenth and twentieth cen­
turies, the emotional language of music was re-evaluated and relativised, 
as it was found that music could express the same affects in different cul­
tures by means of different means, most often completely incompatible 
with those which were prominent in European music. Wilfried Gruhn, 
however, points to the universality of some affective musical structures, 
which he links with some of the most common affects.25 Certain gestures 
associated with the main affects, such as joy, anger, surprise or fear, are 
perhaps rooted in deep archetypical structures and so are not only inter- 
subjective, but also intercultural.26 Admittedly, these gestures can only 
be read on the lowest level of musical understanding, which Gruhn calls 
the ‘external layer of sound’, but that does not alter the fact that affects 
may be perceived across different cultures.27
In the opinion of Arthur Schopenhauer, it was not so much that the 
affects were expressive of human emotions, as human emotions were ex­
pressive of music and helped to shift the theory of the affects -  and more 
broadly of musical emotionality -  to the sole domain of the perception 
(and possibly the reception) of music. In this sense, therefore, the typolo- 
gisation of emotions would be a categorisation, not so much of the music 
itself, as of the receiver’s (utterly individual) feelings. It is worth noting 
that this way of perceiving emotions in music influenced most hétér­
onomie conceptions of music during the twentieth century. It was per­
haps only resisted by the naive hermeneutics of Hermann Kretzschmar 
or Arnold Schering. However, for a change, these scholars deemed it in­
appropriate to turn to sources and tried to reconstruct the world of for­
mer emotions first-hand, imposing contemporary ways of understanding 
on old compositions. Yet Schopenhauer by no means rubber-stamped the
25 Wilfried Gruhn, Wahrnehmen und. Verstehen (Wilhelmshaven, 1989), 159, 190.
26 See Manfred Clynes, The Touch of Emotions (New York, 1977).
27 In Gruhn’s opinion, the comprehension of emotive qualities carried by music 
takes place on the level of the original gestic perception (gestisches Verstehen), then 
on the level of the recognition of the model (Mustererkennung) and finally on the level 
of aesthetic identification (ästhetisches Verstehen). It is worth noting that the percep­
tion of the affect occurs on each of these levels -  original and notionless perception 
(affect as an expression of gesture), structural perception (affect as an element of 
a work’s structure) and also aesthetic, fully conscious, perception (affect as a part of the 
musical message).
death of the theory of affects. The centuries-old way of seeing music in 
these categories was even resistant to Eduard Hanslick’s shattering, ma­
licious critique: ‘the layman “feels” the most in music, the trained artist 
feels the least’.28 It is not surprising, therefore, that in the wake of 
Hanslick’s ‘formalistic’ breakthrough the old holistic take on music, its 
communicative function and anthropological -  to use a contemporary no­
tion -  dimension gives way to a one-sided focus on history, the work, 
structure, analysis and the discussion of genres and readings, seemingly 
detached from the addressee of music — from man.29 Yet the current fash­
ion for musical anthropology and cognitivism is strongly opposed to these 
conceptions and is reviving discourses that were present in former music 
theory, even if they are not normally referred to. So perhaps a combina­
tion of the chiefly Anglo-Saxon modern adaptive ways of seeing music 
and the Germanic Quellenarbeit, reconstructing the knowledge of past 
eras, marks the way forward for contemporary musicology.
Translated by John Comber
28 ‘Der Laie “fühlt” bei Musik am meisten, der gebildete Künstler am wenigsten’; 
see Eduard Hanslick, Vom Musikalisch-Schönen (repr. Wiesbaden, 1975), 135.
29 This thread is broadly and beautifully developed by Wolfgang Suppan, who 
considers that the anthropological dimension of music, which today is beginning to 
constitute an important aspect of research, originates from the musical Renaissance 
and Baroque. Suppan’s assertion that there are today (in musicology) many Han- 
slicks, but what’s missing is a Friedrich von Hausegger, sounds like a rhetorical me­
taphor (‘Es gäbe heutzutage viele Hanslicks -  aber leider keinen Hausegger’); see 
Wolfgang Suppan, Musica Humana. Die antropologische und kulturethologische Di­
mensionen der Musikwissenschaft (Vienna, 1986), 80.
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